Report to Congress on Conditions in Hong Kong of Interest to the United States Section 1256 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (PL 115-232) (22 U.S.C. 5731)
Consistent with sections 205 and 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (the “Act”) (22 U.S.C. 5725 and 5731) and section 7019(e) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. K, P.L. 118-47), as carried forward by the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2025 (Div. A, P.L. 118-83), and the accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement, the Department submits this report and the enclosed certification on conditions in Hong Kong from January 2024 through December 2024 (“covered period”). Please refer to previous years’ reports for information prior to this covered period.
Summary
The Department of State assesses that during the covered period, Beijing took new actions which directly threaten U.S. interests and are inconsistent with the Basic Law and China’s obligation pursuant to the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 to allow Hong Kong to enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Beijing permits Hong Kong to retain some differences from mainland China, including commercial and trade policy, but only so far as these policies offer unique contributions to Beijing’s interests. The overall trend, however, has been one of centralization under Beijing. China and Hong Kong authorities continued to use “national security” as a broad and vague basis to undermine the rule of law and protected rights and freedoms. In the Certification of Hong Kong’s Treatment Under U.S. Laws, the Secretary of State certified that Hong Kong does not warrant treatment under U.S. law in the same manner as before July 1, 1997.
On March 23, 2024, the Hong Kong government enacted the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), adopting Beijing’s overly broad definition of “national security.” Under the supervision of the central government, Hong Kong authorities used the SNSO and the Beijing-imposed 2020 National Security Law (NSL) to further erode the rule of law in Hong Kong and undermine the human rights and fundamental freedoms of people in Hong Kong, as well as to harass and intimidate individuals outside of its borders. On December 24, 2024, authorities used the NSL and the SNSO to issue new arrest warrants and bounties targeting six overseas democracy advocates and cancelling passports for seven others, including some based in the United States. Hong Kong authorities aggressively prosecuted pro‑democracy and media freedom advocates, including the 47 individuals tried in a case known as the “NSL 47,” Jimmy Lai, and former editors of Stand News. Some foreign non-permanent judges on the Court of Final Appeal stepped down, citing political concerns about rule of law. As the number of foreign judges declined, the number of remanded prisoners reached a new high of 40.2 percent of the total prison population.
Impact on Democratic Institutions and Universal Suffrage
As a result of “patriots-only” electoral reforms that effectively barred independent or non-establishment candidates from running for office, all but one seat in the Legislative Council and all District Council positions were held by pro-Beijing officials. Hong Kong authorities did not advance universal suffrage, which the Basic Law describes as its “ultimate aim.”
Impact on Police, Security Functions, and Transnational Repression
Hong Kong authorities used national security legislation to prosecute people and groups expressing views critical of the government, or those affiliated with the pro-democracy movement. In November 2024, a Hong Kong court sentenced 45 of the “NSL 47” pro-democracy advocates, former lawmakers, and journalists to up to 10 years in prison for their involvement in a 2020 unofficial primary election, despite this being peaceful political activity protected by the Basic Law and recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The SNSO expanded the government’s surveillance powers. During the covered period, there were credible reports that government security services monitored pro-democracy and human rights activists, their families and acquaintances, and journalists in Hong Kong. Hong Kong authorities also applied the NSL and SNSO extraterritorially to engage in transnational repression. In December 2024, the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) announced new arrest warrants and bounties of more than $127,000 each targeting six democracy advocates living overseas and canceled passports of seven other activists, including some residing in the United States. The HKPF regularly questioned Hong Kong-based family members and acquaintances of overseas activists. Authorities also utilized expanded NSL powers to seize assets and reportedly froze bank accounts and a pension fund belonging to pro-democracy advocate Chung Kim-wah.
Impact on Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law
During the covered period, Beijing and Hong Kong authorities took actions that eroded Hong Kong’s judicial independence and rule of law. In cases where authorities asserted a nexus to national security, there was no expectation of a fair trial. Human rights groups called pre-trial detention in national security cases a “form of indefinite detention without trial.” As of December 31, 2024, the number of remanded prisoners who had not been convicted increased to a record 40.2 percent of the Hong Kong prison population (excluding immigration detainees).
In October, a Hong Kong court denied jailed Tiananmen Square Massacre vigil organizer Chow Hang-tung’s application to introduce overseas evidence via live television link in her NSL trial. The prosecution cited two non-public letters from the Committee for Safeguarding National Security (CSNS), which reportedly instructed the court to deny the request. Chow criticized the CSNS for undermining Hong Kong’s rule of law, telling the court when a “secret” opinion from the executive can influence or dictate how the court should interpret laws, the law is no longer “objective, public, and accessible.”
After a Hong Kong court convicted 45 of the “NSL 47,” overseas non‑permanent judge on the Court of Final Appeal Jonathan Sumption resigned, calling the ruling “legally indefensible.” During the covered period, five overseas non-permanent judges either resigned or did not extend their terms, and there are now only six overseas judges remain.
Impact on Freedom of Speech or Expression
During the covered period, several individuals were charged under the NSL, SNSO, or a colonial-era sedition law for actions ranging from posting on social media, to wearing allegedly “seditious” clothing, to allegedly “insulting” the Chinese flag or national anthem.
Impact on Freedom of the Press
In August 2024, the Hong Kong Journalists’ Association (HKJA) released a survey showing its members’ perception of press freedom dropped for a fifth consecutive year to 25 (out of 100). Over 92 percent of journalists surveyed reported press freedom declined over the past year, and that the SNSO would further undermine freedom of the press. Respondents cited the ongoing NSL trial of pro-democracy advocate and media owner Jimmy Lai, as well as the entry bans for several foreign journalists as among the causes of the decline. According to an April 2024 report from Reporters Without Borders, 10 journalists and press freedom defenders were detained in Hong Kong. Widespread reports of media self-censorship and suspected content control continued.
In August, a Hong Kong court made its first ruling in a sedition case involving a media outlet since China assumed control of Hong Kong in 1997. Former editors of the defunct Stand News were convicted of publishing seditious materials, and in November a court sentenced them to up to 21 months.
In September 2024, the HKJA reported dozens of Hong Kong-based journalists and their family members were subjected to harassment and online intimidation, with journalists’ families and associates reported receiving anonymous complaints by email or letter from self-proclaimed “patriots.”
Hong Kong has restricted foreign journalists’ travel and visa applications. In September 2024, the government reportedly denied entry to an Associated Press photojournalist who was known for 2023 photographs of Jimmy Lai in prison. In April 2024, immigration authorities denied entry to a staff member of Reporters Without Borders who was visiting to cover Lai’s trial. Authorities limited journalists’ access to information during the covered period.
Impact on Internet Freedom
A Google transparency report revealed Hong Kong authorities submitted requests to remove content in the first six months of the year. In May 2024, the government ordered internet platforms to remove the popular protest anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” after a court upheld a government injunction banning it. On May 14, 2024, YouTube announced it geoblocked Hong Kong users from accessing 32 videos of “Glory to Hong Kong” in compliance with the court order. Several websites with Hong Kong human rights-related content were blocked, including websites for the Hong Kong diaspora magazine Flow and a human rights activist’s Substack.
Impact on Freedom of Assembly
In April 2024, the pro-Beijing Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions announced they would not hold Labor Day marches, which previously were held every year, for fear the event could conflict with the SNSO. In May 2024, national security police arrested eight individuals for actions related to a Tiananmen vigil, including detained pro-democracy activist Chow Hang‑tung and her mother – the first arrests under the SNSO. No public commemoration of the Tiananmen Square Massacre has been held since 2019.
Throughout the covered period, Hong Kong police authorized multiple small protests outside of the U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong and Macau to express views against the United States. Protestors included representatives from pro-Beijing political parties.
Impact on Freedom of Association
Hong Kong authorities continued to use the NSL, the Societies Ordinance, and the Trade Union Ordinance to repress independent unions and other civil society groups. In July 2024, lawmakers passed a bill to expand the Social Workers Registration Board from 15 to 27 members, giving government appointees a majority of seats in the city’s social workers’ licensing body. Seven of the board’s eight elected members quit after the government announced its new proposal.
Impact on Freedom of Movement
According to local media reports, Hong Kong authorities maintain an exit ban “watchlist” of residents who will be intercepted if they attempt to leave Hong Kong, and many former activists and protestors who have been arrested are not allowed to depart Hong Kong as a condition of their bail.
As part of its global campaign of transnational repression, the Hong Kong government canceled passports for seven overseas pro-democracy advocates on December 24, 2024, including some who reside in the United States, alleging they were involved in crimes threatening national security.
Impact on Education and Academic Freedom
During the covered period, Hong Kong authorities restricted expression in schools and universities and reformed curriculum to include “national security education.” In August 2024, lawmaker Starry Lee told local media Beijing would closely monitor the Hong Kong’s implementation of “patriotic education.”
Public libraries, schools, and universities self-censored their holdings, including archives, to comply with the NSL. Hong Kong University required library users to register to access “Special Collections” containing books about the Tiananmen Square Massacre and others written by local democracy advocates. The Hong Kong Public Library required special registration to access microfilm collections on the Tiananmen events. In July 2024, local media reported the organizers of the annual Hong Kong Book Fair removed books due to complaints of “sensitive” content.
Impact on Freedom of Religion or Belief
In its Freedom in the World 2024 report, the NGO Freedom House downgraded Hong Kong’s freedom of expression and belief rating “due to evidence that the broader crackdown on dissent has prompted some churches to self-censor sermons and other religious activities.” In June 2024, Catholic churches canceled memorial masses for victims of the Tiananmen Square Massacre for the third consecutive year, citing concerns of violating the NSL. Hong Kong authorities arrested and prosecuted religious leaders for activities and nonviolent political expression related to the pro-democracy movement. As of the end of 2024, the NSL trial of Cardinal Joseph Zen, the former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong and an outspoken defender of civil rights, remained pending. On March 28, 2024, Cardinal Stephen Chow stated the Catholic Diocese had to adjust certain religious practices to avoid breaking the new security law. According to the report, Falun Gong adherents faced harassment by groups with ties to the CCP.
Impact on U.S. Citizens
Under the NSL and SNSO, U.S. citizens who have publicly criticized China are at a heightened risk of arrest, detention, expulsion, or prosecution. Some U.S. citizens with ties to people or organizations that have been critical of China were held and questioned by immigration authorities upon entering Hong Kong. For more information on potential impact to U.S. businesses, please see the 2024 Updated Hong Kong Business Advisory.
U.S.-Hong Kong Cooperation, Sanctions, and Export Controls
Hong Kong law enforcement entities delayed responses and passively denied official requests from U.S. law enforcement agencies, via repeated requests for additional, often irrelevant information. Conversely, the United States complied with similar requests from the Hong Kong government, which were not reciprocated. Hong Kong law enforcement maintained indirect contact with U.S. counterparts and received U.S. lead information regarding a broad array of criminal offenses, but Hong Kong agencies replied sporadically with limited information. U.S. law enforcement had no substantive official engagement with the HKPF National Security Department during the covered period. In some instances, Hong Kong authorities referred U.S. law enforcement to counterparts in Beijing, further underscoring the SAR’s lack of autonomy.
The United States communicated with Hong Kong authorities on issues involving sanctions implementation. The Hong Kong government maintained it would only implement UN sanctions, not “unilateral” sanctions such as U.S. designations. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority clarified for banks that, while they are under no legal obligation to observe foreign government unilateral sanctions, banks must establish and implement policies for their Hong Kong businesses that incorporate a full assessment of any legal, business, and commercial risks involved. Between January 1 and December 31, 2024, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security identified and designated 54 entities located in Hong Kong that provided support for a foreign military acting contrary to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.
Remaining Key Differences
Beijing permits Hong Kong to retain some differences from mainland China, including commercial and trade policy, but only so far as these policies offer unique contributions to Beijing’s interests. Hong Kong is a separate customs union, sets its own monetary and fiscal policies, retains an open capital account, unlike mainland China, and maintains an open trade regime, with negligible tariff or non-tariff barriers for U.S. goods and services. Hong Kong sets its own data regulations and lacks broad data localization requirements Hong Kong’s commercial and company law generally follows UK common law, providing for the effective enforcement of contracts, dispute settlement, and the protection of intellectual property rights. Hong Kong holds separate representation from mainland China in certain international organizations and multilateral entities, including the Financial Action Task Force, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the International Olympic Committee, and the World Trade Organization. The extent to which the CCP influences Hong Kong votes and actions in these bodies remains unclear.
Hong Kong Policy Act Findings
E.O. 13936, issued in July 2020 to address the suspension of the application of Section 201(a) of the Hong Kong Policy Act to certain U.S. laws and provisions of laws, remains in effect. There were no terminations under section 202(d) or determinations under section 201(b) of the Act during the covered period.
